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Abstract
We present APHRODITE, an architecture designed to reduce false posi-
tives in network intrusion-detection systems. APHRODITE works by detecting
anomalies in the outgoing traffic, and by correlating them with the alerts raised
by the NIDS analyzing the incoming traffic. Benchmarks show a substantial
reduction of false positives between 50% and 100%.
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1 Introduction
Network intrusion-detection systems (NIDSes) are considered an effective second
line of defense against network-based attacks directed at computer systems [5, 11],
and – due to the increasing severity and likelihood of such attacks – are employed
in almost all large-scale IT infrastructures [2].
The Achille’s heel of NIDSes lies in the large number of false positives (i.e.,
false attacks) that occur [27]: practitioners [23, 32] as well as researchers [3, 8, 14]
observe that it is common for a NIDS to raise thousands of mostly false alerts per
day. Julisch [15] states that up to 99% of total alerts may not be related to real
security issues.
False positives are a universal problem as they affect both signature and anomaly-
based intrusion-detection systems [4]. A high rate of false alerts is – also according
to Axelsson [3] – the limiting factor for the performance of an intrusion-detection
system. False alerts often cause an overload for IT personnel [23], who must verify
every single alert, a task that is not only labor intensive but error prone too [9].
Indeed, a high false positive rate can even be exploited by attackers to overload IT
personnel, thereby lowering the defenses of the IT infrastructure.
∗This research is supported by the research program Sentinels (http://www.sentinels.nl). Sen-
tinels is being financed by Technology Foundation STW, the Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research (NWO), and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs.
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Contribution of this paper Our thesis is that one of the main reasons why
NIDSes show a high false positive rate is that they do not correlate input with
output traffic.
To demonstrate this, we have developed APHRODITE (Architecture for false
Positive Reduction): an innovative architecture for reducing the false positive rate of
any NIDS (be it signature or anomaly-based). APHRODITE consists of an output
anomaly detector and a correlation engine (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: APHRODITE architecture
Architecture We assume the presence of a NIDS monitoring the incoming traffic
of the system. The main idea of our approach is simple: a successful attack often
causes an anomaly in the output of the system. For instance, a successful SQL
Injection attack [41] against a web-based system would typically cause the system
to output e.g. SQL tables rather than the usual web pages. Taking advantage of
this, APHRODITE works as follows: when the input NIDS raises an alert, the
correlation engine checks whether the communication that raised this alert causes
an anomaly in the output too (detected by the output anomaly detector). In this
case, the alert is considered a true positive and APHRODITE forwards it to the
IT professionals, otherwise, it is discarded as a false positive. (There are a few
exceptions to this behaviour, taking into account e.g., the possible absence of output
or the quality/quantity of alerts raised by the input NIDS, we explain this in Section
3.)
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Since nowadays attacks against connection-less protocols are less common (see
the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [38] (CVE) database for detailed statis-
tics), we have designed APHRODITE with the explicit goal of reducing false pos-
itives when monitoring network services based on the TCP protocol (although it
can be easily adapted to work with the UDP protocol); furthermore these attacks
can be detected by well-tuned signature-based systems (see Section 2.1 for further
information about tuning).
To our best knowledge, APHRODITE is the first proposed solution to reduce
false positives that:
• works in combination with both signature-based and anomaly-based systems
• operates in a completely automatic way after a quick setup, avoiding any
further human involvement
We have benchmarked APHRODITE in combination with the signature-based
NIDS Snort [35, 36], as well as APHRODITE in combination with the anomaly-
based NIDS POSEIDON [6]. We have carried out the benchmarks both on the
common DARPA 1999 data set [21] as well as on a private data set. In 7 out of 8
cases, our benchmarks show a reduction of false positives between 50% and 100%,
that is a better result than whose of the unique leading competitor [33] (always using
benchmarks on a public data set).
Structure of the paper This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we
introduce intrusion-detection systems and the problems related to false positives.
Section 3 reports the system architecture and its properties. In Section 4 we report
summary results of our benchmarks (detailed results are presented in Appendix A).
In Section 5 we discuss related work. Finally, in Section 6 we draw our conclusions
and set the course for further developments. In Appendix B we report the pseudo
code of APHRODITE.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the concepts used in the rest of the paper and we
explain in a more detailed way than in the introduction how false positives arise in
signature and anomaly-based systems.
2.1 Signature-Based Systems
Signature-based systems (SBSes), e.g. Snort [35, 36], are based on pattern-recogn-
ition techniques: the NIDS contains a known-attack signature database and tries
to match these signatures against the analyzed data. When a match is found, an
alert is raised. A specific signature must be developed off-line, and then loaded into
the database before the system can begin to detect a particular intrusion. One of
the disadvantages of SBSes is that they can detect only known attacks: new attacks
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will be unnoticed till the system is updated, creating a window of opportunity for
attackers (and affecting the NIDS completeness and accuracy [10, 11]). Although
this is considered acceptable for detecting attacks to e.g. the OS, it makes them
less suitable for protecting web-based services, because of their ad hoc and dynamic
nature.
False Positives in Signature-Based Systems SBSes raise an alert every time
that traffic matches one of the signatures loaded into the system. Consider for exam-
ple the path traversal attack, which allows to access files, directories, and commands
residing outside the (given) web document root directory.
To detect these attacks many SBSes (using a out-of-the-box configuration) raise
an alert each time they identify the pattern “../” in the incoming traffic. Unfortu-
nately, this pattern is often present in legal traffic, and this causes SBSes to raise
a high number of false alerts. These false alerts can be avoided by deactivating the
specific rule. On the other hand this prevents the NIDS from detecting this sort of
attacks.
A good deal of the false positives raised by a SBS can be suppressed by a tun-
ing activity: this activity, based on deactivation of unneeded signatures, requires a
thorough analysis of the environment by qualified IT personnel. Finally, to remain
effective, SBSes require a recurrent configuration updating to reflect changes in the
environment: new vulnerabilities are discovered daily, new signatures are released
regularly, and systems may be patched, thereby (possibly adding or) removing vul-
nerabilities.
2.2 Anomaly-Based Systems
Anomaly-based systems (ABSes) use a statistical method to monitor network traffic.
Intuitively, an ABS works as follows: in the setup phase, the ABS builds a model
of the normal network traffic. Later, in the operational phase, the ABS flags as an
attack any input that significantly deviates from the model. To determine when an
input significantly deviates from the model the ABS uses a distance function and a
threshold set by user: when the distance between the input and the model exceeds
the threshold, the alarm is raised.
The ABSes main advantage is that they can detect zero-day attacks: novel at-
tacks can be detected as soon as they take place. Clearly, because of their statistical
nature ABSes are bound to raise a number of false positives, and the value of the
threshold actually determines a compromise between the number of false positives
and the number of false negatives the IT security personnel is willing to accept.
False Positives in Anomaly-Based Systems The high false positive rate is
generally cited as one of the main disadvantages of anomaly-based systems. The
value of the threshold has a direct influence on both false negative and false positive
rates [39]: a low threshold (too close to the model) yields a high number of alerts, and
therefore a low false negative rate, but a high false positive rate. On the other hand
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a high threshold yields a low number of alerts in general (therefore a high number of
false negatives, but a low number of false positives). The most commonly used tuning
procedure for ABSes is finding an optimal threshold value, i.e., the best compromise
between a low number of false negatives and a low (or acceptable) number of false
positives. This is typically carried out manually by trained IT personnel: different
improving steps can be necessary to obtain a good balance between detection and
false positive rates.
3 Architecture
The main idea of our approach is the following: a successful attack (incident) [2]
to a system (e.g. a web service) usually produces an anomaly in the output of the
system. On the other hand, if something in the input of the system causes the NIDS
to raise an alert but does not cause the system to produce an unusual output, then
this alert is likely to be a false positive.
APHRODITE’s architecture consists of two internal and one external compo-
nents. The external component is the NIDS monitoring the incoming traffic. We
do not make any assumption on it other than the fact that every now and then it
raises an alert: as a matter of fact APHRODITE can work together with any kind
of NIDS (be it signature or anomaly-based).
The first internal component is the output anomaly detector (OAD), which is
actually an anomaly-based NIDS monitoring the outgoing traffic: the OAD refers
to a statistical model describing the normal output of the system, and flags any
behaviour that significantly deviates from the norm as the result of a possible attack.
The second internal component is the correlation engine (CE), which tracks
(using stateful-inspection [7]) and correlates alerts related to incoming traffic and
raised by the input NIDS with the output produced by the OAD.
APHRODITE works as follows (see Figure 1): the input NIDS monitors the
incoming traffic while, simultaneously, the OAD analyzes the output of network ser-
vices. When the input NIDS raises an alert, this is forwarded to the CE, together
with the information regarding the communication endpoints (i.e. source and des-
tination IP addresses, source and destination TCP ports) of the packet that raised
the alert. At this moment, the alert is not considered an incident yet (it is a pre-
alert) and is not forwarded immediately to the IT specialists. Next, the CE marks
the communication relative to the given endpoints as suspicious and waits for the
output of the OAD: if the OAD detects an anomaly in the outgoing traffic related
to the tracked communication, then the system considers the alert as an incident
(i.e. a true positive) and the alert is forwarded to the IT specialists for further han-
dling and countermeasure reactions, otherwise it is considered a false positive and
is discarded.
What we just described is the most common behaviour; nevertheless there exist
important exceptions to it. Namely:
1. Missing output response. If the OAD does not detect any output related
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to the pre-alert raised by the NIDS, then the pre-alert is considered an incident
and is forwarded to the IT security specialist. This is because the pre-alert
could belong to a denial of service attack against a certain network service (pre-
venting normal functioning or causing a complete stop), leading to a situation
of missing response.
Therefore, the absence of an output should be considered an anomaly in the
normal data flow and must be handled accordingly to the correlation engine.
To this end, we need to set appropriate application-dependent timeouts (com-
monly a data exchange between peers take place in a short time); after their
expiration the communication can be marked as anomalous.
2. Alert magnitude. When the input NIDS is anomaly-based (as opposed to
signature-based) raised alerts can indicate the alert magnitude too: anomaly-
based NIDS compare the traffic to a statistical model of the traffic, and raise
an alert when the input exceeds a given threshold. Here, by alert magnitude we
indicate the distance between the alert-raising packet and the threshold. The
higher the alert magnitude, the more anomalous is the packet, and therefore
the more likely that it indicates an incident.
In APHRODITE when the magnitude is higher than a given value the alert
raised by the NIDS is considered an incident, even if the OAD has not detected
any anomaly in the output.
3. Number of alert-raising packets. APHRODITE takes into account the
number of anomalies regarding output traffic related to a single endpoint (e.g.
in the past and in the current communications) in a given time frame: this
parameter becomes particularly interesting when the input NIDS is anomaly-
based and packet-oriented, which can mark as anomalous a number of packets
belonging to the same communication.
The pseudo code of APHRODITE (the OAD and the CE) is reported in Ap-
pendix B.
3.1 The OAD
As we mentioned before, the OAD is basically an anomaly payload-based NIDS,
which monitors the output of a system rather than the input of it. In our embod-
iment we choose to use the payload-based POSEIDON [6] as the OAD. Actually,
for the OAD we could have used any anomaly-based NIDS, we chose POSEIDON
because we are familiar with it and because it gives better results than leading
competitor [6].
The fact that the OAD is anomaly-based (rather than signature-based) has
various advantages. Firstly, the OAD can adapt to the specific network environ-
ment/service; secondly it does not require the definition of new signatures to detect
anomalous output, working in an unsupervised way (at least, after the initial setup).
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Creating and maintaining a set of signatures for the outgoing traffic is a thorny and
labor intensive task, as these signatures would heavily depend on the local applica-
tion, and would have to be updated each time that modifications of the application
determine changes in its output content. The disadvantage of using an anomaly-
based system is that the OAD needs an extensive (though unsupervised) training
phase: a significant amount of normal traffic data is needed to build an accurate
statistical model of the legal behaviour.
Setting the threshold As we mentioned in Section 2.2, in ABSes completeness
and accuracy are intrinsically related and they are heavily influenced by the threshold
value. Here, we call completeness the ratio TP/(TP + FN) and accuracy the ratio
TP/(TP + FP ), where TP is the number of true positives, FN is the number of
false negatives and FP is the number of false positives raised during the benchmarks.
Our experiments show that setting the threshold at 3tmax4 , usually yields reasonably
good results; here tmax is the maximum distance between the analyzed data and the
model observed during the training phase.
4 Experiments and results
To validate our architecture, we benchmark APHRODITE in combination with the
signature-based NIDS Snort [35, 36] as well as APHRODITE in combination with
the anomaly-based NIDS POSEIDON [6]. To drive the experiments, we employ
two different data sets. Firstly we use the DARPA 1999 data set [21]: despite
criticism [26, 22] this is a standard data for benchmarking NIDSes (e.g. [40, 33])
and it has the advantage that it allows one to duplicate experiments and to compare
different NIDSes directly. Secondly, we benchmark the system using a private data
set. Appendix A shows detailed graphs with the benchmark results; in this section
we present the highlights.
Tests with the DARPA 1999 data set The testing environment of the DARPA
1999 data set contains several internal hosts that are attacked by both external
and internal attackers. Moreover, hosts inside the local area network are able to
conduct attacks against external hosts. In our tests, we focus on FTP, Telnet, SMTP
and HTTP protocols. There are two reasons for this. Firstly only these protocols
give us a sufficient number of samples we need to train the OAD, and secondly
only these protocols allow us to compare our architecture with POSEIDON, that
has been benchmarked following the same procedures (because of the large sample
set available only for these protocols). Other restrictions are applied to make the
comparison possible: we consider only inbound and outbound TCP packets that
belong to attack connections against hosts inside the network 172.016.0.0/16.
We train the OAD of APHRODITE with the data of weeks 1 and 3 (attack-
free): for each different protocol we use a different OAD instance. Afterward, we
test APHRODITE together with both POSEIDON and Snort using the week 4 and
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5 traffic. In order to distinguish between true and false positives we can refer to the
attack instance table provided by the DARPA data set authors.
Table 1 reports a comparison of the detection and false positive rates of Snort
stand-alone (first column), Snort in combination with APHRODITE (second col-
umn), POSEIDON stand-alone (third column) and POSEIDON in combination with
APHRODITE (fourth column). In both cases, APHRODITE achieves a substan-
tial improvement on the stand-alone system neither affecting the detection rate nor
introducing false negatives: APHRODITE reduces the false positive amount by at
least 50% on every protocol benchamrked, except when we benchmark the Telent
protocol together with POSEIDON. In our opinion, this discrepancy is due to the
great variability of the Telnet service output. APHRODITE is not applied to SMTP
traffic in combination with Snort because in this case Snort raises no false positives.
Protocol Snort
Snort
+
APHRODITE
POSEIDON
POSEIDON
+
APHRODITE
HTTP DR 59,9% 59,9% 100% 100%FP 599 (0,069%) 5 (0,00057%) 15 (0,0018%) 0 (0,0%)
FTP DR 31,75% 31,75% 100% 100%FP 875 (3,17%) 317 (1,14%) 3303 (11,31%) 373 (1,35%)
Telnet DR 26,83% 26,83% 95,12% 95,12%FP 391 (0,041%) 6 (0,00063%) 63776 (6,72%) 56885 (5,99%)
SMTP DR 13,3% - 100% 100%FP 0 (0,0%) - 6476 (3,69%) 2797 (1,59%)
Table 1: Comparison between Snort stand-alone, Snort in combination with
APHRODITE, POSEIDON stand-alone and POSEIDON in combination with
APHRODITE using the DARPA 1999 data set: DR stands for detection rate (attack
instance percentage), while FP is the false positive rate (packets and corresponding
percentage); APHRODITE reduces false positives by more than 50% most of the
time, being close to zero in 3 tests, without affecting the detection rate.
Tests with a private data set To complete our validation, and to see how the
system behaves when trained with a data set that was not made attack-free1, we
consider a second (private) data set we collected at the University of Twente: this is
data set B. Data was collected on a public network for 5 consecutive working days (24
hours per day), logging only TCP traffic directed to (and originating from) a heavy-
loaded web server (about 10 Gigabytes of total traffic per day). This web server hosts
several official the department official web sites as well as student and research staff
personal web pages: thus, the traffic contains different types of data such as static
and dynamically generated HTML pages and, especially in the outgoing traffic,
1This is useful to see how the system performs in the sub-optimal situation in which the IT
security specialist does not have the time to clean up the training data set, a situation that is likely
to occur often in practice.
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common format documents (e.g. PDF) as well as raw binary data (e.g. software
executables). We did not inject any artificial attack.
We focus on HTTP traffic because nowadays Internet attacks are mainly directed
to web servers and web-based applications [17]: Kruegel et al. [18] state that web-
based attacks account for 20%-30% from 1999 to 2004 in CVE entries [38]; further-
more Symantec Corporation reports that in the year 2005 web-based services have
been the third most attacked service (ranked by TCP port), and in the second-half
of the year 69% of total discovered vulnerabilities apply to web applications [37].
To train the anomaly-detection engines of both POSEIDON and the OAD on
the data set B, we simply use a snapshot of the data collected during working hours
(approximately 3 hours, 1,8 Gigabytes of data): it is widely acknowledged that
attackers prefer to conduct malicious activity during non-working hours, when the
system is usually less monitored by IT personnel. The chosen training data set has
not been pre-processed and made attack-free: it is thus possible that the model
includes some malicious activity (in this way, we can evaluate the completeness and
accuracy of the architecture in the presence of noisy data too). For the same reason,
we randomly choose a nightly snapshot (approximately 8 hours, 1,8 Gigabytes of
data) to benchmark POSEIDON stand-alone against POSEIDON in combination
with APHRODITE. Moreover, we set the threshold following the simple heuristics
discussed in Section 3.1. We classified alerts manually and detected 33 attack in-
stances in 59288 input packets: most of the attacks are XSS (Cross-site Scripting)
and SQL Injection attacks [41]. Table 2 summarizes the results we obtained.
We cannot compare APHRODITE in combination with Snort on this second
data set for the simple reason that Snort does not find any attack to the system
(Snort raised only false alerts): by setting a high output threshold in APHRODITE
we could remove all the false positives, but this would give no indication of the
completeness and accuracy of APHRODITE.
Protocol POSEIDON
POSEIDON
+
APHRODITE
HTTP
DR 100% 100%
FP 1683 (2,83%) 774 (1,30%)
Table 2: Comparison between POSEIDON stand-alone and POSEIDON in combi-
nation with APHRODITE using data set B; DR stands for detection rate (attack
instance percentage), while FP is the false positive rate (packets and correspond-
ing percentage); APHRODITE reduces false positives by more than 50% without
affecting the detection rate.
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5 Related work
The problem of reducing false positives has been addressed using two different kinds
of approaches: on the one hand we have techniques for identifying true positives,
and on the other hand we have techniques for identifying false positives.
The main difference between our work and the papers described below consists
of the fact that we take into account the outgoing traffic of the system.
Identifying true positives Ning et al. developed a model [31] and an intrusion-
alert correlator [28] to help human analysts during the alert verification phase. Their
work is based on the observation that most attacks consist of several related stages,
with the early stages preparing for the later ones. The authors introduce the concept
of the prerequisite of an attack, which is defined as the necessary condition for
the attack to be successful. Furthermore, logical formulas are used to describe
relationships between different attack stages, and hyper-alert correlation graphs are
employed to represent correlated alerts in an intuitive way. However, this correlation
technique is ineffective when attackers use a different IP source address at each attack
step. APHRODITE uses the IP source address to relate the packets in a given single
communication and not to correlate with other communications. Ning and Cui [28]
demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach when applied on a small data set:
in [29, 30] the same authors present other utilities they developed to facilitate the
analysis of large sets of correlated alerts, and report some benchmarks employing
network traffic used during the DEFCON 8 Capture the Flag (CTF) event [12].
APHRODITE does not present the same limitations on data set size.
Lee and Stolfo [19] develop a framework based on data mining techniques, such
as sequential patterns mining and episodes rules (see Agrawal and Srikan [1] and Han
et al. [13]), to address the problem of improving attack detection while maintaining a
low false positive rate. The system works by extracting information from audit traffic
and building classification models (specifically designed for certain types of intrusion)
using data mining techniques: connection features (i.e. duration, type, protocol) are
used to build a time-based traffic model, traffic features (i.e. number of connections
directed to the same host or same service in a given time frame) constitutes the
basis for a host-based traffic model while a content model collects content features
information (i.e. data payload, errors reported by the OS, root access attempts). The
system detects attacks combining the models and comparing them with actual traffic
features. Benchmarks have been conducted using the DARPA 1998 data set [20]:
detection score for different attack typologies has a minimum value of 65% with a
false positive rate always below 0.05%. Since the authors use a different data set,
we cannot compare directly the two approaches: we can notice that our approach
does not use information collected from the operating system hosting the monitored
network service(s), thus APHRODITE can work on-line without affecting the host
performance.
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Identifying false positives Pietraszek [33] tackles the problem of reducing false
positives by introducing an alert classifier system (ALAC, Adaptive Learner for
Alert Classification) based on machine learning techniques. During the training
phase, the system classifies alerts into true and false positives, by attaching a la-
bel from a fixed set of user-defined labels to the current alert. Then, the system
computes an extra parameter (called classification confidence) and presents this clas-
sification to a human analyst. The analyst’s feedback is used to generate training
examples, used by the learning algorithm to build and update its classifiers. After
the training phase, the classifiers are used to classify new alerts. To ensure the sta-
bility of the system over time, a sub-sampling technique is applied: regularly, the
system randomly selects n alerts to be forwarded to the analyst instead of processing
them autonomously. This approach relies on the analyst’s ability to classify alerts
properly and on his availability to operate in real-time (otherwise the system will not
be updated in time); we believe that these (demanding) requirements can be con-
sidered acceptable for a signature-based NIDS (where the analyst can easily inspect
both the signature and network packet(s) that triggered the alert), but that it could
be difficult to perform the same analysis with an anomaly-based NIDS. Benchmarks
conducted over the 1999 DARPA data set, using Snort to generate alerts, show an
overall false positive reduction of over 30% (details on single attack protocols are
not given).
It is worth summarizing the main differences between ALAC and APHRODI-
TE; namely: (a) ALAC does not consider the outgoing traffic, and (b) ALAC relies
heavily on the expertise and the presence of an analyst (in APHRODITE, all the
IT specialist has to do is to set the thresholds). Pietraszek and Tanner [34] further
expand the previous work using alert post-processing based on data mining and
machine learning techniques.
Julisch [14] presents a semi-automatic approach for identifying true positives
based on the idea of root cause: an alert root cause is defined as “the reason for which
it occurs”. The author observes that in most environments, it is possible to identify
a small number of highly predominant (and persistent) root causes. Persistent root
causes trigger alert floods that distract IT specialists from identifying real attacks.
The process presented, based on techniques which discover frequently occurring
episodes in a given sequence (see Mannila et al. [24, 25]), consists of two different
steps: the former (called root cause analysis) identifies root causes related to a given
(large) number of alerts. Then, the latter removes spotted root causes and thereby
drastically reduces the future alert rate. Benchmarks conducted on a log trace from
a commercial signature-based NIDS deployed in a real network show a reduction of
87% of root causes. No further details are given about the testing condition, network
topology or traffic typology. The work has been further expanded in [16, 15] to
improve the completeness and accuracy of detection algorithm. We cannot compare
directly this approach with APHRODITE because the data used by the author is
private.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we present APHRODITE, an architecture for reducing false positives
both in signature and anomaly-based NIDSes. The core of APHRODITE consists
of an output anomaly detector (OAD), implemented with an anomaly-based NIDS:
when a standard NIDS (be it signature or anomaly-based) monitoring the incoming
traffic raises an alert, APHRODITE checks if the communication actually produces
an anomaly in the outgoing traffic. In this case (and in another couple of exceptional
situations), the alert is forwarded to the IT specialist, otherwise it is discarded. The
fact that the OAD is anomaly-based (rather than signature-based) allows it to adapt
to the specific network environment/service, and to work in an unsupervised way
(at least, after the setup).
Benchmarks on the DARPA 1999 data set show that APHRODITE determines
a reduction of false positives between 50% and 100% in most of the cases, and that
it does not introduce any extra false negative.
References
[1] R. Agrawal and R. Srikant. Mining sequential patterns. In Proc. 7th Interna-
tional Conference on Data Engineering, pages 3–14. IEEE Computer Society
Press, 1995.
[2] J. Allen, A. Christie, W. Fithen, J. McHugh, J. Pickel, and E. Stoner. State of
the practice of intrusion detection technologies. Technical Report CMU/SEI-
99TR-028, Carnegie-Mellon University - Software Engineering Institute, jan
2000.
[3] S. Axelsson. The base-rate fallacy and the difficulty of intrusion detection.
ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. (TISSEC), 3(3):186–205, 2000.
[4] S. Axelsson. Intrusion Detection Systems: A Survey and Taxonomy. Technical
Report 99-15, Chalmers University, mar 2000.
[5] R. Bace. Intrusion detection. Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 2000.
[6] D. Bolzoni, E. Zambon, S. Etalle, and P. Hartel. POSEIDON: a 2-tier Anomaly-
based Network Intrusion Detection System. In IWIA ’06: Proc. 4th IEEE Inter-
national Workshop on Information Assurance, pages 144–156. IEEE Computer
Society Press, 2006.
[7] Check Point Software Technologies. Stateful Inspection Technology, 2005. URL
http://www.checkpoint.com/products/downloads/Stateful Inspection.pdf.
[8] C. Clifton and G. Gengo. Developing custom intrusion detection filters using
data mining. In MILCOM ’00: Proc. 21st Century Military Communications
Conference, volume 1, pages 440–443. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2000.
12
[9] O. Dain and R. Cunningham. Fusing Heterogeneous Alert Streams into Sce-
narios. In Proc. Workshop on Data Mining for Security Applications, 8th ACM
Conference on Computer Security (CCS’ 01), pages 1–13. ACM Press, 2002.
[10] H. Debar, M. Dacier, and A. Wespi. Towards a Taxonomy of Intrusion-Detection
Systems. Computer Networks, 31(8):805–822, 1999.
[11] H. Debar, M. Dacier, and A. Wespi. A Revised Taxonomy of Intrusion-Detection
Systems. Annales des Te´le´communications, 55(7–8):361–378, 2000.
[12] DEFCON8. Defcon Capture the Flag (CTF) contest, 2000. URL
http://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-8/defcon-8-post.html.
[13] J. Han, J. Pei, and Y. Yin. Mining frequent patterns without candidate. In
SIGMOD ’00: Proc. 19th ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Man-
agement of Data, pages 1–12. ACM Press, 2000.
[14] K. Julisch. Mining Alarm Clusters to Improve Alarm Handling Efficiency. In
ACSAC ’01: Proc. 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
(ACSAC), pages 12–21. ACM Press, 2001.
[15] K. Julisch. Clustering intrusion detection alarms to support root cause analysis.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 6(4):443–
471, 2003.
[16] K. Julisch and M. Dacier. Mining intrusion detection alarms for actionable
knowledge. In KDD ’02: Proc. 8th ACM SIGKDD international conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pages 366–375. ACM Press, 2002.
[17] D. V. Klein. Defending Against the Wily Surfer-Web-based Attacks and De-
fenses. In Proc. of the Workshop on Intrusion Detection and Network Monitor-
ing, pages 81–92. USENIX Association, 1999.
[18] C. Kruegel, G. Vigna, and W. Robertson. A multi-model approach to the
detection of web-based attacks. Computer Networks, 48(5):717–738, 2005.
[19] W. Lee and S. J. Stolfo. A Framework for Constructing Features and Models for
Intrusion Detection Systems. ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security, 3(4):227–261, 2000.
[20] R. Lippmann, D. Fried, I. Graf, J. Haines, K. Kendall, D. McClung, D. We-
ber, S. Webster, D. Wyschogrod, R. Cunningham, and M. Zissman. Evaluating
Intrusion Detection Systems: The 1998 DARPA Off-line Intrusion Detection
Evaluation. In DISCEX ’00: Proc. 1st DARPA Information Survivability Con-
ference and Exposition, volume 2, pages 12–26. IEEE Computer Society Press,
2000.
13
[21] R. Lippmann, J. W. Haines, D. J. Fried, J. Korba, and K. Das. The 1999
DARPA off-line intrusion detection evaluation. Computer Networks: The Inter-
national Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking, 34(4):579–
595, 2000.
[22] M. V. Mahoney and P. K. Chan. An Analysis of the 1999 DARPA/Lincoln
Laboratory Evaluation Data for Network Anomaly Detection. In G. Vigna,
C. Kruegel, and E. Jonsson, editors, RAID ’03: Proc. 6th Symposium on Re-
cent Advances in Intrusion Detection, volume 2820 of LNCS, pages 220–237.
Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[23] S. Manganaris, M. Christensen, D. Zerkle, and K. Hermiz. A Data Mining
Analysis of RTID alarms. Computer Networks: The International Journal of
Computer and Telecommunications Networking, 34(4):571–577, 2000.
[24] H. Mannila and H. Toivonen. Discovering Generalized Episodes Using Minimal
Occurrences. In KDD ’96: Proc. 2nd International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining, pages 146–151. AAAI Press, 1996.
[25] H. Mannila, H. Toivonen, and A. Inkeri Verkamo. Discovery of Frequent
Episodes in Event Sequences. Data Min. Knowl. Discov., 1(3):259–289, 1997.
[26] J. McHugh. Testing Intrusion Detection Systems: a critique of the 1998 and
1999 DARPA intrusion detection system evaluations as performed by Lincoln
Laboratory. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC),
3(4):262–294, 2000.
[27] B. Morin, L. Me´, H. Debar, and M. Ducasse´. M2d2: A formal data model for ids
alert correlation. In Andreas Wespi, Giovanni Vigna, and Luca Deri, editors,
RAID ’02: Proc. 5th Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection,
volume 2516 of LNCS, pages 115–127. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[28] P. Ning and Y. Cui. An Intrusion Alert Correlator Based on Prerequisites of
Intrusions. Technical Report TR-2002-01, North Carolina State University, 26
2002.
[29] P. Ning, Y. Cui, and D. Reeves. Analyzing intensive intrusion alerts via corre-
lation. In Andreas Wespi, Giovanni Vigna, and Luca Deri, editors, RAID ’02:
Proc. 5th Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, volume 2516
of LNCS, pages 74–94. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[30] P. Ning, Y. Cui, D. S. Reeves, and D. Xu. Techniques and tools for analyz-
ing intrusion alerts. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security
(TISSEC), 7(2):274–318, 2004.
[31] P. Ning, D. Reeves, and Y. Cui. Correlating Alerts Using Prerequisites of
Intrusions. Technical Report TR-2001-13, North Carolina State University, 13
2001.
14
[32] P. Ning and D. Xu. Learning attack strategies from intrusion alerts. In CCS
’03: Proc. 10th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security,
pages 200–209. ACM Press, 2003.
[33] T. Pietraszek. Using Adaptive Alert Classification to Reduce False Positives in
Intrusion Detection. In E. Jonsson, A. Valdes, and M. Almgren, editors, RAID
’04: Proc. 7th Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, volume
3224 of LNCS, pages 102–124. Springer-Verlag, 2004.
[34] T. Pietraszek and A. Tanner. Data Mining and Machine Learning – Towards
Reducing False Positives in Intrusion Detection. Information Security Technical
Report, 10(3):169–183, 2005.
[35] M. Roesch. Snort - Lightweight Intrusion Detection for Networks. In LISA
’99: Proc. 13th USENIX Conference on System Administration, pages 229–
238. USENIX Association, 1999.
[36] Sourcefire. Snort Network Intrusion Detection System web site, 1999. URL
http://www.snort.org.
[37] Symantec Corporation. Internet Security Threat Report, mar 2006. URL
https://enterprise.symantec.com/enterprise/whitepaper.cfm?id=2238.
[38] The MITRE Corporation. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures database,
2004. URL http://cve.mitre.org.
[39] H. L. van Trees. Detection, Estimation and Modulation Theory. Part I: Detec-
tion, Estimation, and Linear Modulation Theory. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1968.
[40] K. Wang and S. J. Stolfo. Anomalous Payload-Based Network Intrusion Detec-
tion. In E. Jonsson, A. Valdes, and M. Almgren, editors, RAID ’04: Proc. 7th
Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, volume 3224 of LNCS,
pages 203–222. Springer-Verlag, 2004.
[41] Web Application Security Consortium. Web Security Threat Classification,
2005. URL http://www.webappsec.org/projects/threat/.
15
A Detailed results
Figure 2 shows more accurately what happens to the accuracy and completeness of
POSEIDON stand-alone and POSEIDON in combination with APHRODITE when
we modify the threshold of POSEIDON stand-alone (broken line) and when we
modify the threshold of APHRODITE after having fixed that of POSEIDON to the
best value (unbroken line). Here, we concentrate on the SMTP protocol data of the
DARPA 1999 data set and HTTP protocol data from data set B (these protocols
presented the highest false positive rate, allowing more accurate measurements).
(a) SMTP
(b) HTTP
Figure 2: Detection rates for POSEIDON in combination with APHRODITE using
DARPA 1999 data set (SMTP protocol) and data set B (HTTP protocol): the
x-axis and y-axis present false positive rate (packets) and detection rate (attacks
instances) respectively. Is it possible to observe that APHRODITE presents a lower
false positive rate than POSEIDON on every benchmarked protocol, considering the
same detection rate.
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B APHRODITE pseudo code
In this Section we give a semi-formal description of how APHRODITE works.
DATA TYPE
l = length of the longest packet payload
PAYLOAD = array [1 ..l ] of [0 ..255 ] /* packet payload */
HOMENET = set of IP addresses /* hosts inside the monitored network */
HOST = RECORD [
address : IP address ∈ N
port : TCP port ∈ N
]
PACKET = RECORD [
source : HOST
destination : HOST
payload : PAYLOAD
]
alert = RECORD [
alert :
−∞ if input IDS is signature− based
value ∈ Real if input IDS is anomaly − based
processed : BOOLEAN /* track a processed alert by the OAD */
true alert : BOOLEAN /* alert is marked as an incident */
counter : Integer /* packets marked as anomalous in a single communication */
]
DATA STRUCTURE
τ ∈ N /* number of packets used for training phase */
oad ∈ IDS /* anomaly-based IDS analyzing outgoing network traffic */
out threshold ∈ Real /* threshold used for anomaly detection by OAD */
magnitude threshold ∈ Real /* threshold used to evaluate input alert magnitude */
raising threshold ∈ Integer /* threshold used to evaluate alert-raising packets */
alerts = set of alerts /* alerts received from the NIDS monitoring incoming traffic */
INIT PHASE
/* IT specialists set out threshold, magnitude threshold and raising threshold values */
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TRAINING PHASE
INPUT:
p : PACKET /* outgoing network packet */
for t := 1 to τ /* first, train the OAD with τ samples */
oad.train(p.source.address, p.source.port, p.payload) /* see POSEIDON pseudo code */
end for
TESTING PHASE
INPUT:
p : PACKET /* outgoing network packet */
OUTPUT:
true alerts : set of alerts
for each a ∈ alerts do
/* checks if the packet belongs to a communication
marked as anomalous by the input NIDS */
if (match alert(a, p) = TRUE ) then
anomaly score := oad.test(p.source.address, p.source.port, p.payload)
/* tests if the output is anomalous */
if (anomaly score > out threshold) then
a.true alert := TRUE
true alerts.add(a)
end if
a.processed := TRUE
end if
end for
/* exceptions handling */
for each a ∈ alerts do
if (
(a.processed = FALSE ) or /* missing output response */
(a.alert > magnitude threshold) or /* alert magnitude */
(a.counter > raising threshold) /* number of alarm-raising packets */
) then
a.true alert := TRUE
true alerts.add(a)
a.processed := TRUE
end if
end for
return true alerts
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